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We propose an objective for the firm in a model of  production economies extending over time under 
uncertainty and with incomplete markets.   We derive the objective of the firm from the assumption of 
initial-shareholders efficiency. Each shareholder is assumed to communicate to the firm her marginal 
valuation of profits at all future events (expressed in terms of initial resources). In defining her own 
marginal valuation of the firm's profits, a shareholder  takes  into consideration the direct impact of a 
change in the value of dividends but also the impact of future dividends on the firm's stock price when 
she trades shares. To predict the impact on the stock price, she uses a state price process, her price theory. 
The firm  computes its own shadow prices for profits at all date-events by simply adding up the marginal 
valuations of all its initial shareholders. If no restrictions are placed on individual price theories, the 
existence of equilibria may require financial constraints on a firm's investment when its shareholders are 
more optimistic than the market about the profitability of such investment. We then impose that price 
theories be compatible with the observed  equilibrium: they should satisfy a no-arbitrage condition. We 
show  by  means  of  an  example  that,  with  incomplete  markets  and  no-short  selling  constraints,  this 
restriction on price theories is not enough to bring consistency in the individuals' marginal evaluations: a 
financial constraint on the firm's investment may still be needed to obtain an equilibrium. 
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Investment decisions are often made today by agents who will not themselves
experience all the implications of their decisions. This is a central issue for
long term investments like pollution abatement. It is also an issue for business
investments, because ownership of rms evolves over time. This feature raises
a conceptual issue under incomplete markets. If the current shareholders of
a rm plan trading shares in the future, how will they evaluate alternative
prot streams?
Under complete markets, production plans (including investments) have a
well-dened present value, and maximisation of that present value serves the
interests of all shareholders, present and future. Under incomplete markets,
alternative plans are not valued uniquely by the market, and shareholders
will be concerned with the implications of such plans for the prices at which
they will trade shares in the future. That is, they will be concerned with the
derivatives of stock prices with respect to future prots: how will the stock
price of the rm at time t respond to ulterior prots?
One answer to this question has been proposed in the seminal paper by
Grossman and Hart (1979); namely, that shareholders should equate these
derivatives with their own marginal rates of substitution for income. We
bring out an element of inadequacy in this answer: under incomplete mar-
kets, personal marginal rates of substitution need not correspond to market
responses. In general, current shareholders must evaluate the market re-
sponses, using all the information provided by observables plus (possibly)
their private information and/or subjective beliefs. We label these evalua-
tions price theories and we retain the Grossman and Hart specication of
competitive price perceptions, which leads to dene price theories as vectors
of coecients.
This paper introduces an equilibrium concept that embodies two features:
(i) every rm's current decision is Pareto ecient for the rm's current share-
1We would like to thank Jean-Marc Bonnisseau for numerous, detailed, important
comments, and seminar audiences at Kos, CORE, Paris I, Torino, Salerno, IHS Vienna,
Essex and Roma for useful discussions and suggestions.
2CORE, Universit e Catholique de Louvain, Belgium.
3Centre d' Economie de la Sorbonne, Universit e Paris 1 Panth eon-Sorbonne, France.
4Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Universit a di Brescia, Italia.
1holders; (ii) current shareholders may hold idiosyncratic and rm - specic
price theories. Assuming that these price theories are upper hemi-continuous
in observables, we show that existence of an equilibrium may require bounds
on the ability of a rm to raise investment capital, when there is excess
supply of shares at a zero price (when the proposed investment is under-
nanced). This is a natural feature: it is repeatedly observed on nancial
markets, reecting the possibility that a rm's owners are more optimistic
than the market about the protability of their investment projects. There is
no alternative general way for the market to sanction excessive optimism (or,
for that matter, to cope with excess supply at a zero price). We thus obtain
a general existence result for investment-constrained equilibria, general in the
sense of minimal assumptions on price theories (Theorem 2).
We investigate next whether observables might constrain price theories
to the extent of forestalling the underfunding of investments. Such is the
case under strict no-arbitrage, a standard concept in nance. But strict no-
arbitrage is not guaranteed when short sales are ruled out, as assumed here.
In that more realistic case, the weaker concept of no unlimited arbitrage is
appropriate. We show by means of one example (Example 1 in section 4)
that, even if the price theories of all shareholders are required to satisfy
no unlimited arbitrage, constraints on investments may still be needed to
achieve an equilibrium. We then prove that a sucient condition to obviate
the need for nancial constraints in a two-period model is that all current
shareholders of a given rm agree about a price theory compatible with no
unlimited arbitrage (Theorem 3). But that special result does not extend
to longer horizons; the scope for obviating the need of nancial constraints
through natural restrictions on price theories is limited.
This paper consists of: (i) an extensive non-technical introduction, re-
viewing the problem and the previous literature (sections 1.1 and 1.2 ) and
summarising our contribution ( 1.3 ); (ii) a description of our model (section
2) and a denition of equilibrium satisfying initial shareholder eciency (sec-
tion 3); (iii) a denition and existence theorem for investment-constrained
equilibrium, and some implications of limited arbitrage (section 4); (iv) a
brief section of concluding comments (section 5); (vi) an Appendix collecting
proofs. Sections 1 and 2 - 4 are self-contained and can be read independently.
21 Subject-matter and overview
1.1 General equilibrium and incomplete markets
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the theory of general equilibrium
in production economies extending over time under uncertainty and with
incomplete markets.
The standard model tting these specications is known as GEI: Gen-
eral Equilibrium with Incomplete markets; see, e.g. Geanakoplos (1990) or
Magill and Shafer (1991) for surveys. The basic specication rests on that
in Chapter 7 of Debreu (1959). The economy consists of two kinds of agents:
consumers and rms. Time and uncertainty are captured by an event tree
that species, for each date up to a nite horizon, the set of possible date-
events reecting the (common) information of the agents at that date. There
are L physical commodities at each date-event. With N date-events over the
tree, the commodity space is the NL -dimensional Euclidean space. Each
consumer (household) h is dened by her consumption set in that space, by
her initial endowment of commodities in the same space, and by her prefer-
ences among NL -dimensional consumption vectors. Each rm j is dened
by its production set in the same space. In addition, all rms are initially
owned by the consumers.
In Debreu's model, there exist markets at date 0 for trading all com-
modities (that is, for trading claims to each physical commodity contingent
on each date-event). The resulting model is formally equivalent to that of a
production economy extending over a single period: consumers face a single
budget constraint, over which they maximise preferences; rms maximise the
present value of prots at market prices. Under this complete market sys-
tem, trading in shares of ownership is redundant: at equilibrium each rm
is analogously dened by a vector of event-dependent prots, with present
value equal to the rms market value. Trading in contingent commodities
is a perfect substitute for trading in shares of the rms. Uncertainty makes
no dierence, due to the perfect insurance opportunities provided by the
complete markets. The set of competitive equilibria is also the same as in
Debreu.
An alternative interpretation of the same model had appeared earlier in a
seminal paper by Arrow (1953). Restrict trade in commodities to spot mar-
kets at each date event, and add markets at each date-event for elementary
securities, each paying o in a specic successor date-event. Under perfect
3foresight of future prices, the set of attainable allocations is the same as in
Debreu.
The assumption of complete markets has long been recognised as unrealis-
tic. In the real world, not all contingencies are amenable to perfect insurance.
In the words of Magill and Quinzii (1996, p.4): " the ideal structure of mar-
kets in which everything is traded out in advance would involve prohibitively
large transactions costs". What we encounter in practice is a sequence of spot
markets on which commodities are exchanged (as with Arrow), together with
a limited set of asset markets through which limited reallocation of resources
over time and across date-events is possible (at variance with Arrow). The
resulting model is labelled GEI. Compared with the complete-markets model,
two new features emerge: (i) consumers are faced with multiple budget con-
straints; and (ii) rms are not able to evaluate production plans in terms of
market values.
1.2 Investment under private ownership
1.2.1
The modeling of a production economy under uncertainty and with incom-
plete markets thus raises the issue of dening the decision criterion of the
rms. This is the case even in the simplest, two-period setting. Production
plans have a time 0 component, and N 1 time 1 components (one per termi-
nal date-event). There is a stock market open a time 0 , where shares of the
rms are traded. A shareholder at time 0 after stock-market clearing receives
a dividend equal to the value of the time 0 component of the production plan;
in case of net investment by the rm, that dividend is negative (it operates
like an addition to the stock price). At time 1 , the value of the production
plan at a date-event accrues to the time 0 shareholders as a dividend. The
stock market does not reopen (it would be redundant)1. Consumers know the
production plans of all rms when choosing their portfolios; and the stock
market at time 0 clears through prices.
The new diculty is that, under genuinely incomplete markets, the prots
at time 1 under date-event s ( s = 1;::;N  1 ) need not have a well-dened
market value at time 0 , when production plans are chosen. Indeed, with J
rms, J < N 1 , only the J vectors of date 1 prots are priced by the market.
1Indeed, the value of a rm would be equal to its dividends, and there would be no
incentives to trade shares
4Maximising the present value of prots (through choice of the production
plan) is not well dened. Thus, one needs to specify a decision criterion for
the rm. And the assumption of common, correct point expectations applies
only to commodity prices at time 1 date-events. It does not apply to present
values (at date 0 ) of event-specic prots, since there are no market prices
for these.
Diamond (1967) introduced a notion of Constrained Pareto Optimality
(CPO) for this model. An allocation is constrained feasible if and only if it is
physically feasible, and susceptible of being attained through asset trading at
given production plans. For normative purposes, it is easy to formulate neces-
sary rst-order conditions (FOC) on production plans required by CPO. To
that end, remember that each consumer optimises its consumption subject to
N distinct budget constraints. Denote by  the N -vector of Lagrange multi-
pliers associated with these constraints, and by   the N -vector of ratios s
0.
These dene marginal rates of substitution between income at date 1 in date-
event s and income at date 0. (Under the assumption of perfect foresight,
these marginal rates of substitution are dened at common market-clearing
spot prices for commodities at all date-events.) Consider a rm owned by
a single consumer h, deciding simultaneously about her consumption and
about the production plan of her rm. Then, jointly optimal consumption
and production plans would entail that rm prots are maximal (over the
production set) at the shadow prices  h. For a general case in which the rm
may have multiple shareholders, it is shown in Dr eze (1974) that necessary
FOC for CPO impose that prots of each rm should be maximal at shadow
prices dened as weighted averages of the marginal rates of substitution of
the rm's shareholders, with weights given by respective shareholdings. That
is also a necessary FOC for Pareto eciency of the production plan from
the viewpoint of that rm's nal shareholders. Pending that condition, there
would exist changes in production and zero-sum transfers among sharehold-
ers making all of them better o. That result is an important clarication of
the normative issues raised by market incompleteness in a production econ-
omy: it denes unambiguously a desirable2 decision criterion for the rms,
in a general model under standard assumptions. (It is often referred-to in
the literature as the Dr eze criterion.)
One interesting implication of the FOC for CPO is that, in general, there
may not exist state-prices sustaining simultaneously the constrained-optimal
2Desirable because implied by necessary FOC for CPO.
5plans of all rms. (For illustration, let two rms each be owned by a single
shareholder, and let the shadow prices   of these two consumers be dierent.)
Of course, with limited trading in contingent claims, there is no reason why
such state-prices should exist.
Dr eze (1974) also brings out the important feature that, under incomplete
markets, the set of feasible allocations is not convex. Indeed, the dividends
received by a shareholder, which enter in her budget constraints, are dened
as a product of two endogenous variables, namely the shareholding and the
rm prots. This bilinearity results in a non-convex feasible set for the
economy, the very set over which CPO is dened. Thus, necessary FOC
are in general not sucient. If equilibria are dened by the Dr eze criterion,
equilibria exist, but they need not be CPO3. It is shown in Geanakoplos et
al. (1990) that, generically in initial endowments, they are not CPO4.
The relevance of this analysis for positive economics is limited. The notion
of shareholder (Pareto) eciency of production decisions is clearly appeal-
ing for privately owned rms or small partnerships. For large corporations
listed on stock exchanges, the appeal is much less compelling: shareholder
preferences (their   's) have no natural channel of expression; the role of
shareholders is limited to approval voting at general assemblies. It would
take a lot of faith in the Coase theorem to claim realism for the Dr eze cri-
terion. However, an important step in the direction of realism is provided
by later work of Dr eze (1985, 1989 chapters 2 and 3)) on "equilibria of pro-
duction and exchange", then "equilibria of production, exchange and labour
contracts". The new ingredient is the so-called control principle: for each
rm j , given shareholdings hj , there exists a uniquely (endogenously) de-
ned subset of controling shareholders, say the Board of Directors; decisions
about production plans must be endorsed by a majority of shareholders in-
cluding all the directors. Thus, directors are veto players, a feature that also
circumvents the Condorcet paradox of voting. And it is reasonable to as-
sume that production decisions will be Pareto ecient for the small set of
directors (subject to majority approval by all shareholders). Since the set of
directors is endogenous (related to shareholdings), the general specication
has undeniable realism. The only special assumption is that the correspon-
3Robust examples appear in Dr eze (1974, section 4) - also for the nested case of complete
markets.
4That result carries the momentous implication of potential Pareto improvements
through departures from competitive market clearing; see Dr eze and Gollier (1993) for
an illustration.
6dence dening the set of directors (as a function of shareholdings) is upper
hemi-continuous for the discrete topology (see appendix 2 of Dr eze 1989)5.
1.2.2
The characterisation of CPO as developed by Dr eze is specic to a model
extending over two periods. The extension to T > 2 periods appears in
Bonisseau and Lachiri (2006). It is still the case that CPO requires rms to
maximise prots at shadow prices obtained as weighted averages of the cor-
responding shadow prices (marginal rates of substitution) of their sharehold-
ers. But a new dimension arises: the shadow price for prots at date-event s
should reect the shadow prices of shareholders at that date-event - namely
the shareholders to who these prots will accrue (either as dividends or as
retained earnings incorporated in stock prices). Accordingly, implementing
a decision criterion compatible with CPO calls for information not readily
available; namely, the identity and shadow prices of future shareholders -
some (many?) of which have no part in today's decisions! As we all know,
there are many important economic decisions where concern for the interests
of future stakeholders (future generations!) plays a determinant role: just
think about climate change, exhaustion of natural resources or the public
debt. In such contexts, the current generation must assess the implications
of its current decisions for future stakeholders. That issue is receiving due
attention. It is less widely appreciated that the very same feature is present
in the daily operations of business rms, when markets are incomplete. That
feature is also at the core of the present paper. In contrast with the social
choice examples mentioned above, it is expected that current shareholders
decide (choose investment and production plans) in light of their own inter-
ests. Ideally, one would hope that markets (here nancial markets) bring
these own interests in line with those of future shareholders: the evolution of
the market value of a rm will reect the interests of its future shareholders.
It is in the interest of current shareholders to maximise the future value of
the rm. But how to achieve this remains problematic.
Generically, the identity and holdings of shareholders will not be the
same at a future date-event s as today. A household's shareholdings at s
5Examples of acceptable specications include: all shareholders holding at least %
of the shares, the n biggest shareholders, the leading shareholders owning at least % of
the shares. Also, there could be a single director (CEO), so the model encompasses a
managerial theory of the rm
7will depend upon the portfolio policy (share trading) of that household, as
guided by the household's preferences and endowments on the one hand, by
the production plans and market prices of the rms on the other hand. These
portfolio policies are private information, devoid of public disclosure. And
prospective shareholdings carry no well-dened voting rights today.
Actually, the problem already arises in the two-period model, if the pro-
duction decisions are made by initial shareholders, prior to clearing of the
stock market. These decisions are in the hands of one set of shareholders,
but have implications for a (generically) dierent set. The T > 2 prob-
lem outlined in the previous paragraph is there! It is also the very problem
motivating the present paper.
That problem was recognised for the rst time in the important paper
by Grossman and Hart ((1979) (GH)), who considered an arbitrary nite
horizon. For simplicity, we discuss it here in the two-period framework, with
production decisions nalised before clearing of the stock market. The gist
of the new diculty is this. When initial shareholders evaluate a rm's
production plans, they take into account their own plans to trade shares;
hence, they become concerned with stock prices, not just dividends. For a
household planning to buy (sell) shares, a low (high) market price is a bonus.
The attractiveness of rm j's production plan for h is no longer dened by
dividends alone; it also depends upon the impact of that production plan on
the rm's market value. More specically, the attractiveness for h of rm
j's prots in state s now depends on (i) dividends (multiplied by h's nal
holdings in state s) and (ii) the impact of rm j's prots in state s on the
rm's market price today (multiplied by the number of shares that h plans
trading). The second element is not directly observable, under incomplete
markets. Household h is thus facing a new problem in forecasting: not
only future prices matter, but also derivatives of today's market prices with
respect to future prots. These derivatives could, in principle, be evaluated
by computing (!) the impact of a change in the production plan of rm j on
the equilibrium price vector, hence on the price of j. But this would amount
to introducing an element of market power in the reasoning. Instead, GH
introduced a new assumption, labeled "competitive price perceptions" (CPP),
concerning the perceptions by consumers of the impact of additional prots
at some future event s on the market values of rm j at earlier date-events.
Let us represent these perceptions by (S + 1)-vector, to be denoted hj for
consumer h and called h 's price theory. What does it mean to entertain
competitive price perceptions? Magill and Quinzii (1996, p.382) mention
8two properties:
- "the price of a bundle of goods is the sum of the prices of its components;
- the unit price of each component is independent of the number of units
of the good purchased or sold."
Applied to the forecasting of price changes on the stock market, where
shares are bundles of goods dened by future prots, these principles imply
that consumer h's perceptions of price changes for the shares of rm j can











s (ps  dy
j
s) (1)
where dqj is the anticipated variation of the market price of rm j at 0 and
psdyj
s the change of its future prots at s.
The assumption of CPP in GH satises this denition7, but goes far be-
yond: these authors assume that h 's price theory, the same for all rms of
which she is a shareholder, is given by h 's own marginal rates of substitution
 h. A trivial application reveals the shortcomings of that restrictive speci-
cation. If h is a consumer expecting to die (from a terminal illness) in state
s leaving no heirs behind, h
s could be zero. It would be preposterous for h
to assume on that ground that additional prots at s will not be valued by
the market at t = 0 ! Accordingly, we do not follow GH on that path (the
justication by MQ on p.386 notwithstanding). It is unfortunate that two
distinct assumptions, namely "competitive price perceptions", which is ne,
and "price perceptions reecting own consumption preferences" ("egocentric
price perceptions"?) have been lumped under a single heading- initially by
GH, but subsequently by the whole literature. As explained below, "egocen-
tric price perceptions" have the momentous implication of cancelling from the
evaluations of production plans the terms involving portfolio transactions.
6Price theories are allowed (not assumed!) to be rm specic because, as explained
in 1.2.1, at a constrained-optimal solution there need not exist state-prices sustaining
simultaneously the production plans of all rms.
7In this informal discussion we abstract from the presence of constraints on short selling.
91.3 Price theories and equilibrium
1.3.1
We are now (at long last!) ready to introduce the contribution of this paper
to the theory of equilibria in production economies under uncertainty and
incomplete markets. We propose an equilibrium concept based on initial-
shareholders eciency We retain the assumption of perfect foresight, that
is common, correct (at equilibrium), single-valued price expectations. We
endow each household h with a set of price theories hj measuring the an-
ticipated impact of future prots on today's stock prices while satisfying
competitive price perceptions as discussed above, and we derive the deci-
sion criteria of rms by the principle of initial shareholders eciency, to be
dened presently.
The idea of initial shareholders eciency is straightforward: the pro-
duction plan chosen by rm j at date zero is such that there do not exist
an alternative production plan and transfers of initial resources among the
shareholders making all of them better o. This principle leads at once to
the property that the value of the chosen production plan is maximal at
shadow prices reecting the marginal valuations of the shareholders (see the
Proposition in section 2.2).
Each shareholder is assumed to communicate to rm j her marginal valu-
ation of prots at future date events (a valuation expressed in terms of initial
resources). Prots at s are distributed to nal shareholders at s . In dening
its own marginal valuation of rm j 's prots, a shareholder h will take two
elements into consideration:
- prots (dividends) at date-event s are rst valued at h 's shadow price
(  h
s ) for resources at s , multiplied by the nal (post-trade) shareholding of
j by h , jh;
- next, h takes into account the impact of prots at s on the market value
of j at node t = 0 ; this impact is assessed according to h's price theory, and
applied to the volume of h's trade - thus with a positive sign in case of a sale,
and a negative sign in case of a purchase.
The two elements are then added, and the sum denes h's marginal val-
uation of rm j's prots at date-event s, hj
s .
Note that these calculations rely on the consumption and portfolio plans
of h. By themselves the shadow prices for resources  h do not convey the
relevant information, if not combined with the planned portfolio trading plans
10and the consumer price theories.
Now, rm j computes its own shadow prices for prots at all date-events,
j, by simply adding up the marginal valuations of all its initial shareholders.
There is no weighting involved, because shareholdings have been taken into
account by the shareholders themselves in computing their own marginal
valuations.
An equilibrium is a feasible allocation (x;;y) and prices ( p for commodi-
ties, q for shares) such that all markets clear and all agents optimise: (xh;h)
is best for h's preferences subject to h's budget constraints; yj has maximal
present value at the shadow prices j. Note that we do not enter the agents'
price theories as elements of the equilibrium; we regard their formation (how
they emerge from observations and expectations) as part of the primitives;
see 1.3.3 infra.
We regard the proposed equilibrium concept as a rst step, calling for the
same extension that Dr eze (1989) adds to Dr eze (1974), namely an endoge-
nous board of directors, .... But this rst step is the natural stepping stone
towards the more realistic extension.
1.3.2
The rst analysis of existence of equilibrium in a temporal production econ-
omy with incomplete markets goes back to the seminal paper by Radner
(1972). In this paper, the issue of the decision criterion of rms is eschewed
by assuming existence of a primitive utility function for each rm (for its om-
nipotent manager). Radner then proves existence of a pseudo-equilibrium. If
all stock prices are strictly positive, every pseudo-equilibrium is a full-edged
equilibrium. But situations may arise where the price of a rm is zero, and
there is excess supply of shares. Such situations correspond to investment
programs deemed protable by the decision-maker(s) in the rm, but not
by the market. They correspond to real-world situations where a rm oers
new shares for subscription, but these are not fully subscribed by investors.
In this paper, a reasonable decision criterion is introduced, namely eciency
for initial shareholders. Existence of a pseudo-equilibrium then follows from
fairly standard assumptions. But the possibility of excess supply of shares at
zero price remains open. This is a realistic possibility, resulting in a nancial
constraint on the investment policy of the rm. Accordingly, we dene an
investment-constrained equilibrium under which a rm's fund raising (nega-
tive dividend) is subject to a nancing constraint, when there is excess supply
11of shares at a zero price8. And we demonstrate the existence of such an equi-
librium (Theorem 2) with arbitrary price theories { which also shows that
no restrictions on price theories are implied at an investment - constrained
equilibrium.
1.3.3
Theorem 2 places no restriction on individual price theories, beyond the
natural requirement of upper hemi-continuity in observables. Under com-
plete markets, price theories are given by market prices. Under incomplete
markets, price theories should be compatible with observations. When the
market prices of assets satisfy no-arbitrage, that property should be inherited
by price theories. But there is no ground to impose strict no-arbitrage when
short sales are excluded, as we assume here for the sake of realism. A weaker
property, no unlimited arbitrage, is then relevant. We prove (Theorem 3) the
existence of equilibria at which investment constraints are not binding when:
(i) price theories satisfy no unlimited arbitrage, and (ii) all intial sharehold-
ers of a rm hold identical price theories. Unfortunately, that result does not
extend to more periods. As noted above, the scope for obviating the need of
nancial constraints through natural restrictions on price theories is limited.
2 Model
The simplest model of an economy under uncertainty is one in which eco-
nomic activity extends over two periods of time: t = 0, today, and t = 1,
tomorrow. At t = 1, one of S mutually exclusive states of the world re-
alizes. The state of the world is unknown at t = 0, when production and
consumption plans are made.
There are nitely many consumers H = f1;:::;h;:::;Hg and rms
J = f1;:::;j;:::;Jg. Finitely many commodities L = f1;:::;l;:::;Lg
are traded at spot prices ps 2 RL
+ at every node s 2 S = f0;1;:::Sg. A
production plan for rm j is a vector yj 2 Y j  RL(S+1). A consumption
plan for consumer h is a vector xh 2 R
L(S+1)
+ .
At t = 0, shares of the J rms are also traded at prices q 2 RJ
+. For
simplicity we assume that no other nancial instruments are available for
8Excess supply of shares at a zero price is the translation, in our model, of under-
subscription of a new emission.
12trade. Saving and insurance needs of a consumer are reected in her chosen
portfolio of rms' shares, h 2 RJ
+ (no short sales).
Consumer h is described by her utility function : uh : R
L(S+1)
+ ! R,
by her initial endowment of commodities, wh 2 R
L(S+1)
+ and by her initial
endowment of shares: h 2 [0;1]J.
We make the following assumptions on the fundamentals of our economy:
For each consumer h, the utility function uh is (A.1) continuously dier-
entiable, (A.2) quasi-concave, (A.3) weakly monotone and (A.4) strictly
monotone in good l = 1 in every date-event s; (A.5) wh 2 R
L(S+1)
++ and P
h2H hj = 1, 8j 2 J;
For each rm j, the production set Y j  RL(S+1) (B.1) is convex, (B.2)
is closed, (B.3) satises free disposal:  R
L(S+1)








For given prices (p;q) and given production choices of all rms, y = (yj)j2J,
































s) for all s = 1;:::;S: (3)
The consumer chooses her portfolio and consumption bundle so as to



































0. From (3),  h
s is consumer h's marginal rate of substitution
between revenue in state s tomorrow and revenue today. Equation (5) can









s) for all j 2 J
with equality if jh > 0.
2.2 Price theories and the objective of the rm
Dr eze (1974) and Grossman and Hart (1979) proposed criteria for the rm
based on the idea that shareholders should not be able to identify a change
of production plan and a set of transfers at t = 0 which make all of them
better o.
Following Grossman and Hart, we assume that production plans are de-
cided at t = 0 by the original shareholders9. A production plan yj is (initial)







where Hj := fh 2 H : hj > 0g is the set of initial shareholders of rm j.
To interpret this expression, consider the eect of a marginal change of
production at node s, dyj
s, on the utility of consumer h 2 Hj. Using the























As in the standard GEI model, we assume that consumers have correct
expectations of equilibrium prices, and plan their consumption and portfolio
choices accordingly. When, as shareholders of rm j, they contemplate a
proposed change in the rm's production plan, they consider the eect on
the dividends received at t = 1, but also the capital gains or losses that the
proposed change would induce through its eect on the shares' price at t = 0.
9Dr eze assumes instead that production plans are decided by nal shareholders, in
order to elucidate the prospects for Constrained Pareto Optimality.
14To evaluate this eect they need to form expectations on the way in which
the price of the stock would be aected, dqhj.
We call these expectations the consumer's price theory. In principle a
price theory may be very complicated, for example it could be derived from
a thorough knowledge of the structure of the economy and of the new equi-
librium that would obtain if the production change were to be implemented.
At the other extreme, it could be a purely subjective belief.
We retain the idea, introduced by Grossman and Hart, that "competitive
price theories" can be fully characterized, for any given observed prices and
production plans, (p;q;y), by a vector of coecients  2 R
S+1
++ ; if the original
shareholder h of rm j has a price theory hj, she evaluates the change in





















































is consumer h's marginal valuation, at the proposed allocation, of an addi-
tional unit of rm j's prot at node s.
Initial shareholder eciency can thus be expressed by saying that there




















s : Then the previous reasoning leads to:
Proposition: Given prices (p;q), production choices y and price theories ,











Remark 1. If h is buying shares of j in t = 0, and thinks that  hj
s   h
s
she might be in favor of a plan that reduces prots in s, psdyj
s < 0, because
she expects a substantial drop in price today after the announcement of the
new plan.
Remark 2. The Grossman and Hart (1979) hypothesis, unfortunately10
labelled "competitive price perceptions", introduces a particular price theory










Under this price theory, when each consumer assumes that the price exactly
incorporates her own evaluation of the proposed production plan, the div-
idends and price terms in our denition of hj
s cancel out, leading to the
Grossman-Hart criterion:
hj








Remark 3. Even if all original shareholders of rm j use the same price
theory,  hj =  j, the state price vector communicated to the rm need not














Indeed there may still remain dierences in the evaluation of the dividend
eect, as reected in the expression for j. Two special cases are worth
mentioning. If all original shareholders plan to sell completely their shares,
hj = 0 for all h 2 Hj, all that matters for them is the price eect and we
obtain j =  j. If, on the other hand, the original shareholders only exchange
shares between themselves so that original and nal shareholders coincide, P










10See the discussion in paragraph 1:2:2 of the introduction.
16an analog of the criterion originally studied by Dr eze (1974).
Remark 4. In a series of paper, Makowski (1983a,b, Makowski and Pepall
1985), and then Allen and Gale (1988, 1989) and Bisin, Gottardi and Ruta
(2009), argued that, in a competitive market, shareholders of rm j should all
use the following function to forecast the eect of a change in the production













Makowski in particular was the rst to prove that if all shareholders use
this forecasting function, then they unanimously support the maximization
of ^ qj() as the objective of the rm. The function ^ qj() does not t our
denition of an admissible price theory because it cannot be reduced to a
vector of state prices. Starting from a production plan yj, for any particular
proposed change dyj we could write
 
j(dy
j) =  
h(dyj)





s)]: the 's of dierent individu-
als may be used to evaluate dierent production plans. The informational
requirements are much more demanding than those embodied in our deni-
tion: for every possible deviation, one has to know the equilibrium 's of the
individuals that would like to hold shares of the rm after that deviation.
3 Equilibrium




s s = 1g. Following the discussion in the









describing how individual h forms her price theories11 from the observable
variables (p;q;y). We make the following continuity assumption:
11Each consumer h actually needs a price theory only for the rms of which she is an
original shareholder, but we omit this renement.
17(A.6) For every h and every j, Ahj is an upper hemi-continuous correspon-
dence.







satisfying assumptions A(1)   A(6) and B(1)   B(4).
An equilibrium for E consists of spot prices p, stock prices q, price theories ,
consumer state prices , consumption plans x, portfolios , production plans
y, such that,
(1) for each j 2 J:
P
h hj = 1;








(3) for each h and each j, hj 2 Ahj(p;q;y);
(4) for each h:
(xh;h) solves Max (xh;h)

uh(xh) s.t. (xh;h) 2 Bh(p;q;y)
	
, and h is
the vector of marginal utilities of revenue at all date-events;
(5) for each j 2 J: given its initial shareholders Hj := fh 2 H : hj > 0g,



























Conditions (1) and (2) are the market clearing equations for assets and
commodities. Condition (4) is consumers' optimisation. Condition (5) re-
quires optimal behavior by rms given our criterion and the admissible price
theories of initial shareholders ((3)).
184 Existence
Radner (1972) was the rst to address the issue of existence in an economy
with uncertainty and incomplete markets. He assumed that each rm chooses
its production plan y to maximize a (continuous and strictly concave) rm
specic utility function uj dened over the vector of dividends at all date-
events. In his formulation, the objective of the rm is exogenously given
and not derived from the preferences of shareholders. Radner could not
show the existence of an equilibrium, but only of a weaker notion, which he
called psuedo-equilibrium, in which conditons (1) and (2) in the denition are
weakened to:
(1') for each j 2 J: qj(
P
h hj   1) = 0 and
P
h hj  1;










that is, at a pseudo-equilibrium there may be free disposal of shares and
downscaling of production when the price of a rm is zero.
Our model is not a special case of Radner's. The most important dier-
ence is that in our case the objective of the rm is derived from a notion of
shareholders' optimality and is therefore endogenous: the 's used by the rm
to discount prots are functions of shareholders' consumption and portfolio
choices. Still, we can prove that a pseudo-equilibrium exists in our model:
Theorem 1. Under assumptions (A:1) (A:6) and (B:1) (B:4)
there exists a pseudo-equilibrium for E.
Grossman and Hart (1979), with an objective of the rm derived, as in our
case, from the preferences of the shareholders, were able to prove the existence
of a full-edged equilibrium.
The crucial step in their proof uses a property, which we call consistency,










This property, an easy consequence of the Grossman - Hart assumption
that for every h h = h, plays an important role in going from a pseudo
- equilibrium to an equilibrium. Indeed, when paired with the fact that
19inaction is alway possible, it implies that, whenever qj = 0 at a pseudo-




s) = 0: A proportional
rescaling of the production plan then remains optimal for the rm, and one
can reinterpret a pseudo-equilibrium as an equilibrium with yj0 =
P
h hjyj
and hj0 = hj
P
h hj.
As the following example illustrates, with our broader notion of admissible
price theories it may well happen that at a pseudo-equilibrium the property




s) for some rm j (j = 3 in the
example).
Example 1. Consider an economy in which uncertainty is described by two
possible states at t = 1, S = f0;s;s0g. One commodity is traded in each
state, L = f1g:
There are three individuals, H = f1;2;3g, with the same utility function







and endowments of goods: w1 = (11
2 ;30;3), w2 = (11
2 ;3;30), w3 = (3
2;0;0) .




























4) j y0  0g
and initial ownership as follows: 1 = (1
2; 1
2; 27
56), 2 = (1
2; 1
2; 27
56), 3 = (0;0; 2
56).
One can show that all the conditions in the denition of a pseudo-equilibrium
are veried with:
 Prices: q = (0;0;0).
 Price theories: 1 = (1; 2
5; 2
5), 2 = (1; 2
5; 2
5), 3 = (1; 1
20; 1
20).
 Firms' objectives: 1 =  1 = (1; 1
12; 2
3), 2 =  2 = (1; 2
3; 1
12),
3 =  333 + 131 + 232 + (33   33)3 = (1; 4
5; 4
5).
 Production plans: y1 = ( 1
2;0; 3
4), y2 = ( 1
2; 3
4;0), y3 = ( 1; 5
6; 5
6).
20 Shares: 1 = (1;0;0), 2 = (0;1;0), 3 = (0;0; 3
4).
 Consumption plans: x1 = (5;30; 15
4 ), x2 = (5; 15




The example shows that at a pseudo equilibrium the actual, rescaled pro-
duction plan need not be optimal for the rm, so that a full equilibrium
cannot be attained by rescaling production and shareholdings. Firm 3 plans
y3
0 =  1, but, given 33 = 3
4, its actual input is only 33y3
0 =  3
4. With











4 t 0:62. 
4.1 Constraints on investment
As we argued in the previous section, under the stated assumptions we cannot
prove the existence of an equilibrium for our economy.
The problem arises when the rm plans an investment but its price is
equal to zero and there is an excess supply of its shares, so that the required
nancing cannot be collected from the shareholders.
In the example, the objective of rm 3 (see the expression for 3) takes
into account the marginal evaluations of individuals 1 and 2, who plan to sell
their shares and anticipate a capital gain. Individual 3 has a dierent price
theory and plans to buy shares, but he is not ready to subscribe the total
planned investment.
The non existence of a full edged equilibrium reects the fact that with
incomplete markets, even under the strong hypothesis of perfect foresight,
publicly observable market data need not provide enough information to
bring consistency in individuals' evaluations of possible capital gains and
losses. When this is the case, the aggregation of shareholders marginal eval-
uations may lead the rm to the choice of a production that cannot be fully
nanced.
This observation suggests modifying the notion of equilibrium by adding
to the maximization problem of the rm a constraint on fund raising which
becomes binding exactly in this case. We illustrate the idea in the context
of the previous example.
Example 1 (continued). At the pseudo-equilibrium calculated above, rm
3 plans to use input y3
0 =  1, but, given 33 = 3




21Suppose now that, when the price of a rm is zero, a quantity constraint
comes into action, limiting the investment of the rm. That is, let us in-
troduce parameters k = (kj < 0)j2J and impose that, if qj = 0, the rm





The parameters k are equilibrating variables, determined at equilibrium
to assure consistency and market clearing.
A constrained equilibrium is obtained with k3 =  3
4 (and k1 = k2 <  1
2,
non binding).










he chooses 33 = 1.
















3 t 0:89 >
4
5
Given the new 3, at the solution of the rm 3's problem the constraint
is binding and the rm is optimizing at  y3
0 = 3
4. 
The idea illustrated in the example can be generalized. Let us dene
an investment-constrained equilibrium for E as a collection of spot prices p,
stock prices q, price theories , consumer state prices , consumption plans
x, portfolios , production plans y, and constraints k 2 RJ
  such that,
(1) for each j 2 J:
P
h hj = 1;








(3) for each h and each j, hj 2 Ahj(p;q;y);
(4) for each h:
(xh;h) solves Max (xh;h)

uh(xh) s.t. (xh;h) 2 Bh(p;q;y)
	
, and h is
the vector of marginal utilities of revenue at all date-events;
(5) for each j 2 J: given its initial shareholders Hj := fh 2 H : hj > 0g,



































(6) if qj > 0, then p0y
j
0 > kj.
To prove the existence of an investment-constrained equilibrium we need
to be sure that the feasible set of every rm j, Yj, is continuous in the relevant
variables. To this end, we make the following two additional assumptions12:
(A.0) For each consumer h, uh is strictly monotone in x0l for every l 2 L.
(B.0) For each rm j, Y j  RL
   RLS
+ , and for all yj 2 Y j, y
j
0 = 0 implies
yj = 0.
Theorem 2. Under assumptions (A:0) (A:6) and (B:0) (B:4),
there exists an investment-constrained equilibrium for E.
4.2 No arbitrage and consistency
In our denition of the economy we take the price theories of individuals
as given and do not impose any restriction on them except a form of con-
tinuity. As we argued in the introduction, even under strong assumptions
of rationality and perfect foresight of equilibrium prices, there is no reason,
when markets are incomplete, to assume that individuals form correct out-of-
equilibrium expectations of share-price changes when they consider possible
deviations from the equilibrium production plans. Still, one may want to
12An analogous problem araises in the theory of equilibria with price rigidities and
quantity constraints on net sales. In the latter case, existence of equilibrium requires
a special assumption (like initial endowments in the interior of the consumption sets,
or strictly positive prices for all commodities). The same is true here. But rms are not
assumed to hold initial endowments. So, we fall back on strictly positive prices (implied by
A.0), and we need to add strictly positive investments (i.e. a production plan with inputs
only and no initial outputs, (B.0)). There clearly remains scope for further investigation
of this more general approach.
23investigate whether some restrictions on admissible price theories could be
deduced from knowledge of the equilibrium values of prices and production
plans (p;q;y).
An important idea coming from the theory of nance is that the absence of
arbitrage implies that the prices of traded assets can be explained on the basis
of underlying "state prices" reecting the market evaluation of revenue in the
possible states of the world. An implication of this idea is that, based only
on the observation of equilibrium prices and payos, one can put restrictions
on the estimation of the market evaluation of revenue in the dierent states.
More precisely, from the fundamental theorem of asset pricing (Ross
(1978)), we know that, for given spot prices and production plans, (p;y),
the stock prices q satisfy no - arbitrage, q 2 NA(p;y), if and only if there











s) for all k 2 J: (7)
When markets are complete there is only one solution to this equation,
and the market evaluation of revenue in the possible states can be perfectly
inferred from the observation of equilibrium prices and production plans.
When markets are incomplete the solution is not unique, but the set of
admissible 's is nevertheless restricted.
One could then think that each individual should use as her price theo-
ries vectors of state prices compatible with the observable variables and the
assumption of no arbitrage.
Indeed, it is easy to show that, if at a pseudo-equilibrium equation (7)
is satised by the price theories of every individual, the property of con-
sistency holds and the pseudo-equilibrium can be turned into a full edged
equilibrium.
In our model though, there need not be any vector of state prices satis-
fying equation (7) at the pseudo-equilibrium, due to the assumption of no
short selling13 ( hj  0 for all h and j).
When short sales are not allowed, a weaker necessary condition holds
at a pseudo-equilibrium, no-unlimited-arbitrage, as characterized in The-
orem 7.3.2 of Leroy and Werner (2001, p.68): for given spot prices and
13This can be conrmed by adapting to our context Example 4.4.1, p. 36, of Leroy and
Werner (2001).
24production plans, (p;y), the stock prices q satisfy no - unlimited arbitrage,











s) for all k 2 J: (8)
We may then formalize a restriction on admissible price theories as fol-
lows.
For given (p;q;y) with q 2 NUA(p;y), let 
(p;q;y) be the set of vec-
tors  2 R
S+1














(A.6') For every h and every j, Ahj is an upper hemi-continuous corre-
spondence such that Ahj(p;q;y) 2 
(p;q;y) \ S for any (p;q;y) such that
q 2 NUA(p;y).
This is the correct expression, in our model, of the idea that no-arbitrage
arguments should discipline the price theories of individuals.
Unfortunately, as illustrated in Example 1, imposing this discipline is not
enough to obtain consistency. Indeed, in the example, the price theories of
the three consumers do satisfy assumption (A:60).
The weak form of no arbitrage compatible with our model allows us to
prove the existence of equilibrium under the additional assumption of com-
mon price theories among the initial shareholders of any given rm15:
(A.7) For all j, if h;h0 2 Hj, then Ahj = Ah0j.
14Correspondences satisfying (A.6') exist, for example one could use the map that as-
sociates to any (p;q;y) the (normalized) marginal utilities of revenue, hs, of a given
consumer h.
15Assumptions (A:60) and (A:7) do not guarantee the existence of an equilibrium in a
model with more than two periods. Even if two shareholders agree on the anticipated
variation of the rm price at a node st in period t > 0, they will in general use dierent
h
st's to discount that variation back in terms of t = 0 revenue.
25Theorem 3. Under assumptions (A:1)   (A:5), (B:1)   (B:4),
(A:60) and (A:7), there exists an equilibrium for E.
The notion of equilibrium and its relationship with alternative notions
are illustrated in the following example16, adapted from the one in Due
and Shafer (1986) and Dierker and Dierker (2007).
Example 2. Consider an economy in which uncertainty is described by two
possible states at t = 1, S = f0;s;s0g. One commodity is traded in each
state, L = f1g: There are two consumers, H = f1;2g, with utility functions
u









and endowments: w1 = (1;0;0), w2 = (1;1;1). There is one rm, J = 1,
owned by consumer 2, 1 = 0, 2 = 1, with a technology such that the cost
to produce (ys;ys0) = (Y;Z) tomorrow is y0 =  (Y 2 + Z2).
Given a criterion  = (1;s;s0), the rm chooses (Y;Z) to maximize
 =  (Y
2 + Z
2) + sY + s0Z;









At a Grossman-Hart equilibrium, Mr. 2 sells the rm to Mr.1, 2 = 0,
so that s = 2
s = 1
3 and s0 = 2
s0 = 2
3, and the chosen production plan is
(yGH




To calculate our proposed solution, notice that, under A:7, a price theory
 is admissible if at the observed (q;Y;Z) it satises the NUA inequality
q + (Y
2 + Z
2)  sY + s0Z: (9)
If the initial owner, consumer 2, has a price theory  and plans to sell the


















16In the example we do not specify the individual maps Ahj's. Implicitly we are assuming
that consumers may have any price theory satisfying the NUA admissibility condition. The
example thus illustrates the potential multiplicity of equilibria.
26Combining equations (9)and (10), we see that there exists an equilibrium






At all of these equilibria 1 = 1 and 2 = 0, but dierent values of  lead
to dierent production choices.
Among the admissible price theories, consumer 2 may use the true marginal







12. Notice though that, if the only observables are
(q;Y;Z), all equilibria sustained by  such that 2
s + 2
s0  1 are equally
admissible. 
5 Concluding comments
The main contributions of this paper have been: (i) to introduce a reasonable
concept of shareholder eciency for a standard production economy with in-
complete markets, a concept that reveals the role of anticipations about the
impact of future state-dependent prots on current stock prices; (ii) to bring
out the potential role of nancial constraints when these anticipations remain
idiosyncratic and largely unconstrained, a role embodied in the realistic con-
cept of investment-constrained equilibrium; (iii) to prove a general existence
theorem for that equilibrium concept; and (iv) to record some implications
of the property that anticipations be consistent with no-unlimited-arbitrage.
There remains scope for: (v) exploring further reasonable constraints on
the anticipations, and (vi) extending our analysis to more realistic models, in-
cluding decisions resulting from the control principle with endogenous boards
of directors, also in a Temporary General Equilibrium framework.
Less immediately, there is scope for integrating more ambitiously the
general equilibrium approach with nance theory. The fact that constrained
optima may fail to be sustained by state prices (see the discussion in section
1:2:2) is an important departure from standard modeling in nance. The
leeway admitted by equilibrium for anticipations of price derivatives (for our
price theories) is a warning of potential proliferation of assets created on the
basis of erratic anticipations. It is also a warning of potential deviations
linked to stock options. There is an undeniable avour of current relevance
to these developments, which deserve research priority.
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30Appendix
We rst dene a modied notion of pseudo-equilibrium, which we use as a tool in
the proof of Theorem 3. As an intermediate step we prove a simple but crucial
Consistency Lemma. The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 follow the main steps in the
proof of Theorem 3.
A1. Modied Pseudo-Equilibrium
Dierently from the denition of pseudo-equilibrium, in a modied pseudo-equilibrium
consumers are aware of possibility of free disposal of shares; they fully anticipate
its occurrence, and revise their marginal valuation of an additional unit of revenue
in a given state accordingly. We model this by introducing rescaling factors j's
in the denition. The concept is not meant to have any descriptive appeal. We
will use it only in an intermediate step in the proof of Theorem 1.
A modied pseudo-equilibrium for E consists of spot prices p, stock prices
q, price theories , consumer state prices , consumption plans x, portfolios ,
production plans y, and anticipated re-scaling factors  such that
(1) for each j 2 J: qj(
P
h hj   1) = 0 and
P
h hj  1;











(3) for all h and j, hj 2 Ahj(p;q;y);
(4) for each h: (xh;h) solves Max (xh;h)

uh(xh) s.t. (xh;h) 2 Bh(p;q;y)
	
,
and h is the vector of marginal utilities of revenue at all date-events;
(5) for each j 2 J: given its initial shareholders Hj := fh 2 H : hj > 0g,


























31In (5), the denition of the objective of the rm takes into account that free
disposal of shares may alter the actual share of a rm held by a consumer at the
pseudo-equilibrium. Condition (6) denes the rescaling factors j in terms of the
actual number of shares held by consumers.
A2. Consistency Lemma
Lemma 1 At a modied pseudo-equilibrium, if any of the following
conditions hold:
i) for all h and all j, hj = h.










s) for all k 2 J:
iii) for all h and all j, hj satises the NA equations

hj













s) for all j 2 J:



















































From this expression, if condition i) holds, we can use the rst order conditions





















h2Hj hj(qj   p0y
j
0) = (qj   p0y
j
0):


































h2Hj[jhj + hj   jhj](qj   p0y
j
0) =




using again the rst order conditions of the consumer's problem and the fact that
 satises the NUA inequalities.





























A3. Proof of Theorem 3
The proof is divided in three parts. In Part I we show that a modied pseudo
equilibrium exists for an economy compactied by imposing some articial bounds.
In Part II we show that, starting from a modied pseudo-equilibrium, using
(A:60), (A:7) and the Consistency Lemma, we can construct an equilibrium for the
compactied economy. Finally, in Part III we show that the articial bounds can
be removed.
Part I.
We normalize prices as follows: (p0;q) 2 L+J 1, ps 2 L 1 for all s 6= 0.
The space of prices is thus Q = L+J 1
Q
s1 L 1. Moreover we take h 2 S
and hj 2 S , for all h 2 H, j 2 J.



















33as the set of feasible allocations of commodities. Then, according to Assumption








F in its interior for all h 2 H, and Y
j
m := Yj \M
contains projYjF in its interior for all j 2 J, where M denes the n-dimensional
hyper-cube [ m;m]n with n := (L(S + 1)H + L(S + 1)J).
We impose an articial lower bound on portfolios bhj() := hj to avoid P
h 
hj
s = 0 at any s. In Lemma 2 we show that for any m big enough we can
always choose (m) small enough that Bh(p;q;y) 6= ; on the relevant domain. Let
h
m = [bhj((m));m]J denote the set of constrained portfolios.
Lemma 2 Let =min fwh
ls j l 2 L;h 2 H and s 2 Sg and Jm > .
If (m) = (





m, consumer h's budget set is non - empty, i.e. Bh(p;q;y) 6=
;.
Proof: We prove the result by dening, for any m big enough, an (m) and a
feasible portfolio such that the budget constraint is satised at any prices and
production plans.
Let 0 <  < 1 and h = h.































Each of the terms inside the parentheses is bounded below by  Jm because
 m  y
j
`s for all s ` and j. If  <

Jm, the lower bound is positive.
If m is big enough,





Having bounded portfolio holdings away from zero and from above, we can
limit the range of the scaling factors j = 1 P
h hj to a compact set T  R+.
Call the truncated economy Em.
Proposition 3 Assume (A:1)   (A:6) and (B:1)   (B:4). Then there exists a
modied pseudo-equilibrium for Em.
34Proof of Proposition 3:
Step 1: Dening the xed point correspondence.

















and z = (p;q;;;x;;y;). The pseudo-equilibria correspondence is dened as
G : Z  Z (14)
z 7! ((Ch(z))h;(Pj(z))j;M(z);(Ahj(z))hj;(h(z))h;(T j(z))j)




m ! S is the upper hemi-continuous correspondence
describing h's price theory, T j :
Q
h2H h
m ! T is the continuous function den-
ing rm j's scaling factors, as in point (6) of the denition of modied pseudo-
equilibrium; and the correspondences f(Ch)h;(Pj)j;M;(h)hg are respectively,
consumers' compensated demand correspondences, rms' choice correspondences,
and the market auctioneers' correspondences, that we dene as follows.
For any h 2 H, dene the consumer's compensated demand correspondence as









m j h  Gh(p;q;y;xh;h)  0;
uh(xh)  uh(x)for all (x;) 2 Xh
m  h
m




















































































35Then, for any j 2 J,
P














is the rm's production correspondence.
For any h 2 H, let










be consumer h's Lagrange multipliers correspondence.
Finally, let the auctioneer's choice correspondence be













































The correspondence G embodies all equilibrium correspondences for con-
sumers, producers, and the auctioneer, respectively. The set Z is compact
and convex by construction and Assumptions (B:1) and (B:2). The set S is
compact as well. We need to show that the correspondence G satises the
hypotheses of Kakutani's Fixed-Point Theorem, so that a xed point zm (we
omit the subscript m from variables, unless specied otherwise) exists.
Lemma 4 The compensated demand correspondences (Ch)h, the supply cor-
respondences (Pj)j and the market agents' correspondences M and (h)h,
are non empty and convex valued, and upper hemi-continuous.
36Proof: The proofs for (Ch)h, M and (h)h are standard; we provide details
for (Pj)j.
For any given (;;;;p), the maximum of the continuous function
V j(
j(;;;);p;) over the non empty compact set Yj
m exists . This guar-
antees the non emptiness of the values of the correspondence Pj. The com-
pactness of the values of Pj follows from the continuity of V j(
j(;;;);p;)
and the compactness of Yj
m. The convexity of the values of Pj follows
from Assumption (B:1) and the denition of Pj. Finally, showing that the
graph of Pj is a closed subset is sucient for the upper hemi-continuity
of Pj since the correspondence takes its values in a compact subset. Let
(zn)n = (pn;qn;n;n;xn;n;yn;n)n 2
Q
n Z be a sequence of elements that
converges to z = (p;q;;;x;;y;) and yj
n 2 Pj(zn) for all n. Recall that
Z results from the cartesian product of a family of compacts, hence closed
subsets. So, each limit point belongs to each relative set. Using the continu-
ity of 
j and V j on their domains, then one obtains by passing to the limit
that: for all y0j 2 Yj
m, V j(
j(;;;) p;yj)  V j(
j(;;;) p;y0j) which
means that yj 2 Pj(z). Hence, the graph of Pj is closed. 
By assumption (A.6), Lemma 4 and the continuity of the function T j for
each j 2 J, the correspondence G is non-empty and convex valued as well as
upper hemi-continuous. By Kakutani's Fixed-Point Theorem, there exists a
xed point ~ zm := (~ p; ~ q; ~ ; ~ ; ~ x; ~ ; ~ y; ~ ) 2 Z.
Step 2: A xed point ~ zm := (~ p; ~ q; ~ ; ~ ; ~ x; ~ ; ~ y; ~ ) is a modied pseudo-
equilibrium for the truncated economy Em.




















hj   1  0:






















hj   1)  0:
37so that the value of the auctioneer's objective in t = 0 is non-positive. Simi-















The properties stated in the Lemma follow because, if any of them failed,
there would exist ((p0;q);p) 2 L+J 1 
Q
s L 1 giving a positive value to
the auctioneer's objectives, contradicting the denition of M. 
Thanks to Lemma 5, we can assume that m is big enough so that the
consumption of each consumer at the pseudo-equilibrium is in the interior
of the the hyper-cube M = [ m;m](L(S+1)H+L(S+1)J). We use this property
from now on.
Lemma 6 For all h 2 H,
(~ xh; ~ h) solves Max (xh;h)fuh(xh) s.t. (xh;h) 2 Bh(~ p; ~ q; ~ y)\[Xh
m h
m]g,
and the components of ~ h 2 R
(S+1)
++ are the Lagrange multipliers of the above
maximization problem.
Proof: The proof follows a standard argument once we show that, at the
xed point, the budget set has an interior point. By the monotonicity of uh
(A.4), when m is big enough so that ~ xh is in the interior of the compact set
Xh
m, we must have ~ h  0. Using this, and the assumption of strictly positive
endowments (A.5), we see that the budget dened by ~ hGh(~ p; ~ q; ~ y; ~ xh; ~ h)) 
0 has an interior point. 
Lemma 7 For all j 2 J,
~ yj solves Max yj
n
V j(j(~ ; ~ ; ~ ; ~ ); ~ p;yj) s.t. yj 2 Yj
m
o
where for all yj 2
Yj
m, V j(j(~ ; ~ ; ~ ; ~ ); ~ p;yj) =
P
s j
s(~ ; ~ ; ~ ; ~ )(~ psyj
s), and for all s

j





s (~ ; ~ ; ~ ; ~ )
with 
hj


























s for all s = 0;:::S, and the fact that h~ h
0~ 
hj
0 > 0 by
Lemma 6 . 









































Proof: Aggregating over all consumers the binding budget constraints (given
Assumption (A:4) and Lemma 6) and using the non-negativity of the prices








= 0; j 2 J



















By free-disposal (B:3), we obtain equalities in the market clearing conditions
for commodities. 
This ends the proof of Proposition 3.
Part II.
Proposition 9 Assume (A:1) (A:5), (A:60), (A:7) and (B:1) (B:4). Then
there exists an equilibrium for Em.
Proof of Proposition 9:
If at a modied pseudo-equilibrium ~ qj > 0 for all j, we have market
clearing of the asset market,
P
h ~ jh = 1, ~ j = 1 for all j, and a modied
pseudo-equilibrium is an equilibrium.
39We now argue that if at a modied pseudo-equilibrium for some rm j
~ qj = 0 and
P
h ~ jh < 1, we can always re-scale the production plan, the
shareholdings and the price and obtain a full equilibrium.
Consider a modied pseudo equilibrium (~ p; ~ q; ~ ; ~ ; ~ x; ~ ; ~ y; ~ ) with ~ qj = 0
for some rm j.






s) = 0: (20)
Indeed, under (A:60) and (A:7), the Consistency Lemma implies that P
s ~ j
s(~ ps~ yj
s)  0. We can conclude that the inequality is in fact an equality
because otherwise the rm would have done better by stopping activity, which
is always a feasible choice.
We now re-scale production plans, portfolios and prices as follows: ^ jh =
~ j~ jh, ^ yj
s = 1
~ j ~ yj, ^ qj = 1
~ j ~ qj.
Clearly,
P
h ^ jh = 1, and we may set ^ j = 1. Then, for all j and all s,
j
s(~ ; ~ ; ~ ; ~ ) = j
s(^ ; ~ ; ~ ; ^ ) = ^ j
s (see eq. (11)).
The re-scaling does not aect the consumer budget, nor the consumers'
rst order conditions.
Finally, the rescaled production plan ^ yj is feasible (~ j  1, 0 2 Y j and
convexity of Y j) and optimal for rm j at the (unchanged) state prices
^ j = ~ j (^ j^ yj = 1
~ j ~ j~ yj = 0). In other words, the re-scaled plan belongs
to the ecient boundary of the production set Y j at the (unchanged) state
prices used by the rm.
We have shown that for the truncated economy Em, a modied quasi-
equilibrium ~ zm = (~ p; ~ q; ~ ; ~ ; ~ x; ~ ; ~ y; ~ ) is transformed into an equilibrium ^ zm =
(~ p; ^ q; ~ ; ~ ; ~ x; ^ ; ^ y) after re-scaling. 
Part III.
Proposition 10 Assume (A:1)   (A:5), (A:60)), (A:7)) and (B:1)   (B:4).
Then there exists an equilibrium for E.
40Proof of Proposition 10:
Assumption (B:4) ensures that for m big enough at the equilibrium of
the truncated economy, ^ zm, all endogenous variables dening other than own-
ership shares are in the interior of the hyper-cube M; moreover, for all m P
h ^ hj
m = 1 for all j and all s, so that the the upper bound on ownership
shares is also not binding.
Let m go to innity. All variables remain in compact sets, so there exists
a converging subsequence. Let z be its limit. Conditions (1), (2) and (3) in
the denition of equilibrium are satised at the limit.
By Assumptions (A:2) and (A:4), (xh;h) is a solution of consumer h
unconstrained decision problem, so that condition (4) is also veried. Finally,
using Assumption (B:1) and the convexity of the objective function V j of
rm j on Yj, yj is a solution of rm j unconstrained decision problem, (5).

Remark: The argument in Part III does not apply to a sequence of modied
pseudo-equilibria, because it may be that, for some j,
P
h hj = 0 in the
limit, leaving j undened. The notion of modied pseudo-equilibrium was
introduced because the argument in Part II does not apply to a pseudo-
equilibrium.
A4. Proof of Theorem 1
The proof follows from the proof of Theorem 3 if one notices that a pseudo
equilibrium is a modied pseudo equilibrium in which for all j j is xed
to be identically equal to one, and condition (6) in the denition of pseudo-
equilibrium is omitted. The argument in Part I of the proof shows that a
pseudo equilibrium for the truncated economy exists, and the argument in
Part III can be applied directly to the sequence of pseudo-equilibria.
A5. Proof of Theorem 2
The proof follows the steps of Parts I and III of the proof of Theorem 3, but
some important modications are needed.
Consider the truncated economy Em.
41We introduce a new set of variables  2 [m;m]J. The auctioneer at t = 0
now chooses (p0;) in the non empty compact convex set






p0l = 1; 2 [ m;m]
Jg:




























J T and z = (p;q;;;;x;;y;k;). The constrained-equilibria
correspondence for the truncated economy Em is dened as
G0 : Z0  Z0 (21)
z 7! ((Ch(z))h;(Pj0
(z))j;(Ahj(z))hj;(h(z))h;M0(z);(Kj(z))j;(Qj(z))j(T j(z))j)
where Ahj : Q0 
Q
j2J Yj
m ! S is the upper hemi-continuous corre-
spondence describing h's price theory, the correspondences (Ch)h, (h)h and
(T j(z))j are as in the proof of Theorem 3, the functions (Kj(z))j and (Qj(z))j
are as dened above, while the rm's and auctioneer correspondences f(Pj0)j;M0g
are dened as follows.





































The role of the term minl[p0l] will be claried later.

















































Proposition 11 Assume (A:0) (A:6) and (B:0) (B:4). Then there exists
a fund-constrained equilibrium for Em.
To apply Kakutani's Theorem to the correspondence G0, we need to show
that the auctioneer's correspondences M0 and the supply correspondences
(Pj0)j are non empty and convex valued, and upper hemi-continuous. For M0
this follows from standard arguments. We prove the upper hemi-continuity
of (Pj0). This is where the term minl[p0l] in the denition of P
j0
j plays a
role17. At a point z where p0 = 0, P
j0
j = Yj
m; the upper hemi-continuity of
P
j0
j then follows from the next Lemma.
Lemma 12 The correspondence Yj : Q0 [ 2 m;0] ! Yj
m is i) upper hemi-
continuous and ii) lower hemi-continuous at all (p0;kj) with p0  0.
Proof: Given the compactness of Yj
m, to prove upper hemi-continuity it is
enough to show that the graph of the correspondence is closed. Let (p0n)n
be a sequence converging to p0, (kj
n)n a sequence converging to kj and (yj
n)n
a sequence converging to yj, with (yj
n)n 2 Yj(p0n;kj




n for all n, we have p0y
j
0  kj, and yj 2 Yj(p0;kj).
17We are following an idea of Greenberg (1977).
43To prove lower hemi-continuity at point (p0;kj) with p0  0, let (p0n)n be
a sequence converging to p0  0, (kj
n)n a sequence converging to kj and (yj)
an element of Yj(p0;kj). We have to construct a sequence (yj
n)n converging
to yj such that (yj
n)n 2 Yj(p0n;kj
n) for all n.




In this case for n large enough p0ny
j
0 > kj





0 = kj < 0:
Using the fact that, by (B.1) and (B.3), Yj
m is convex and 0 2 Yj
m,
and noticing that p00 > kj, we can construct a sequence satisfying
the denition of lower hemi-continuity by taking convex combinations
between yj and 0.
iii) p0y
j
0 = kj = 0: By (B:0), and p0  0, it must be that y
j
0 = 0. We can
then use the constant sequence yj
n = yj = 0.

The correspondence G0 is non-empty and convex valued as well as upper
hemi-continuous. By Kakutani's Theorem, there exists a xed point.
We now show that, starting from a xed point ~ zm := (~ p; ~ q; ~ ; ~ ; ~ ; ~ x; ~ ; ~ y;~ k; ~ )
we can construct a fund-constrained equilibrium for the truncated economy
Em.




















hj   1 = 0:






















hj   1)  0:
This implies that the value of the auctioneer's objective in t = 0 is non-
negative. Indeed, using the denition of M0




h ~ hj   1) > 0 and ~ j > 0, so that Qj(~ ) = ~ j,
- or (
P
h ~ hj  1) = 0, in which case Qj(~ )(
P
h ~ hj  1) = ~ j(
P
h ~ hj  1).
- or (
P
h ~ hj   1) < 0 and ~ j =   m , in which case Qj(~ ) = 0 and
Kj(~ ) = 0 so that, using (B:0), ~ p0~ y
j
0 = 0. But then we could modify
~ zm so that (~ xh;hj0) 2 Ch(~ zm) satises (
P
h ~ hj0   1) = 0. Notice that,
after the adjustment, j0 = 1 and the criterion of the rm is unchanged.
Without loss of generality, at a xed point, for all j, Qj(~ )(
P
h ~ hj   1) =
~ j(
P
h ~ hj   1), and the value of the auctioneer's objective at t = 0 is non-
positive. Aggregating the time 1 budgets we also have that the value of
the auctioneer's objective is non-positive also for all s 6= 0. The properties
stated in the Lemma follow because, if any of them failed, there would ex-
ist ((p0;);p) 2 P0 
Q
s L 1 giving a positive value to the auctioneer's
objectives, contradicting the denition of M0. 
Thanks to Lemma 13, we can choose a  m > 0 big enough so that for any
m   m the choices of each consumer at the xed point are in the interior
of the the cube M = [ m;m](L(S+1)H+L(S+1)J). Using this property, we can
continue the proof of Proposition 11 as in Part I of Theorem 3. A new aspect
is that we need to show that, at a xed point p0  0, so that rms are indeed
maximizing the objective V j. But this follows from (A:0) and the fact that
for all h, p0wh
0 +
P
j qjhj > 0. Indeed, if for some l, p0l = 0, then, by (A:0),
xh
0l = m, contradicting Lemma 13.
Also, for m   m, if at the xed point qj > 0, then kj <  m    m <
 p0y
j
0, so that condition (6) in the denition of investment-constrained equi-
librium is veried.
To complete the proof of Theorem 2, we let m go to innity and consider
a sequence ~ zm of investment-constrained equilibria for Em. The variables 
45are bounded from above. Indeed, if for some j, j;m ! 1, we would have
qj ! 1, giving innite wealth to consumers with hj > 0. Under (A:0),
this contradicts Lemma 13. On the other hand, it may be that for some j,
j;m !  1 or kj;m !  1. In this cases we dene j =   m and kj =  2 m.
All other variables except portfolio holdings are in compact sets. Along the
sequences
P
h hj = 1 for all j, so that even portfolios remain in a compact
set. Thus there exists a limit point ~ z. To show that the limit point is an
investment-constrained equilibrium of E, we have to show that, at the limit,
~ p0  0, but this follows from (A:0), using the same argument as above. 
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